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Throughout Pakistan’s history, policy has sought to promote exports 
through government support and incentives. The government machinery is 
geared to export promotion especially through direct and indirect subsidies. 
Surprisingly, these policies have been continued without serious examination. 
This paper makes a first attempt to evaluate these policies by estimating the 
impact of two such schemes—export financing and rebate/refund schemes—on 
export performance. Our analysis shows that, over the long run, the export 
financing scheme had a negative effect on exports while the rebate/refund 
scheme affected exports insignificantly. Subsidy schemes clearly do not seem to 
work, yet they have been retained for many years.  
 
JEL classification:  C32; F13; F14; F31  
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Export promotion has appropriately been an important policy objective of 
all Pakistan’s governments for many years. Policies made for this purpose have 
all sought to subsidise exports or push exports through government intervention 
(see Appendix A).
1 Instead, these incentive systems have led to illicit export 
practices such as export over-invoicing due to weak policy implementation. Such 
practices have resulted in significant financial loss to the country and undermined 
the effectiveness of export-promoting policy [Mahmood and Azhar (2001)].  
Two subsidies have been maintained to promote export in 1973, the 
export finance scheme (EFS) was introduced
2 with a view to promoting non-
traditional exports. Later, it was applied to all commodities. In October 1977, all 
commodities except raw cotton, rice, wool, and hides and skins were included in 
this scheme. Duty drawback or the rebate scheme has been applied to various 
selected commodities since the 1960s. The objective of this duty drawback is to 
make Pakistan’s exports more competitive in world markets by providing raw 
materials and intermediate goods at zero duty.  
This paper evaluates the impact of export finance and duty drawback 
(rebate/refunds) schemes on the growth of exports. The organisation of the paper 
is as follows: Section 2 describes the two schemes, and their importance and 
trends; Section 3 presents and explains empirical findings; and Section 4 draws 
conclusions from the study. 
 
2.  EXPORT SUBSIDY SCHEMES: HOW WELL  
HAVE THEY WORKED? 
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)’s EFS was introduced in 1973 with a 
view to facilitating non-traditional and emerging commodities. Four years later, 
all manufactured goods were included in the scheme,
3 under which, exporters 
could borrow at concessionary rates. The difference between rates on EFS and 
the market lending rate varied between 0.5 percent in December 1994 and 7.4 
                                                 
Aknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Dr A. R. Kemal, Mr Arshad Khan, Mr 
Sajawal Khan and participants of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) 
‘Nurturing Minds’ seminar for valuable suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Mr 
Safdarullah and Ms Irem Batool also provided research assistance. All errors remain the authors’ 
responsibility. 
1For further details on export promotion policies, see http://www.epb.gov.pk/epb/jsp/faq.jsp. 
2The exchange rate was fixed at PRs 9.90/$ in1973.  
3Concessional credit was not available for exporters of raw cotton, rice, wool, and hides and 
skins.   2 
percent in December 1998 [Janjua (2004)].  However, under the reforms process 
these margins were rationalised afterwards. Currently, the gap between the 
SBP’s announced EFS rate and the market lending rate is fixed at 2 percent.
4  
Under the rebate/refunds scheme, custom duties, sales tax, and excise 
duty, etc. paid on raw materials were refundable if the goods made of these raw 
materials were exported afterwards.
5 As under the EFS, the primary objective of 
this scheme was also to encourage taxpayers/exporters to export more. 
Procedures were rationalised by standardising rates and linking the drawback to 
the FOB value of exports.
6  
These export promotion subsidy schemes are difficult to administer and 
are subject to manipulation for rent-seeking purposes. For example, export 
financing is available on production of an irrevocable letter of credit, which can 
easily be falsely obtained. It is difficult to check whether funds that have been 
obtained are being used for the purpose intended, while exporters complain of 
procedural delays. It is because of rent-seeking possibilities and procedural 
difficulties that many economists have called for these policies to be 
discontinued.  
The Central Board of Revenue (CBR) (2000) addresses the problem of 
fake invoices and delays in refunds cause by the need to manually verify 
documentation. The study concluded that the prevailing duty drawback rates 
(DDRs) were higher than the actual incidence of custom duty on those items.
7 
The report also concluded that DDR procedures were complex and in some parts 




Pakistan’s export performance over the last 35 years has been less than 
spectacular, especially when we account for extensive government efforts to 
boost exports (see Figure 1).
10 Through the 1970s and 1980s, exports as a 
                                                 
4For more details on export financing, see Janjua (2004). 
5Rebate/refunds were 2 percent of total exports in 2003–04 (4.77 percent in 2001–02), 
meaning that exporters were earning 2 percent profit directly. 
6See http://www.epb.gov.pk/epb/jsp/faqans.jsp?faq_id=8. 
7The abolishment of the refund scheme last year for the textiles sector was based on the 
same fact because (i) most cottage industries are outside the tax net but generally claim rebate, and 
(ii) documentation problems prevent authorities from streamlining these industries. 
8See the following websites: http://www.asmara.com/drawback.htm, http://dateyvs.com/ 
custom07.htm, http://www.dutydrawback. info, and http://icsbroker.com/ Drawback% 20definitions.htm  
9While policy intends well, political economy considerations point to the possibility of 
misuse. 
10The government devotes an extraordinary effort to promoting exports, based on the large 
number of official visits for this purpose to the entire commerce ministry doing nothing else but 
promoting exports. In addition, there a number of agencies, such as the Export Promotion Bureau, 
that devote substantial resources to export promotion. There are also a large number of civil servants 
who are placed as commercial officers in most Pakistani embassies at considerable expense. Given 
the static export/GDP ratio over the last decade and a half, there is urgent need to examine the 
efficacy of these efforts.    3 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) declined even from the low level of 
5 percent in 1970. In the late 1980s, we see the ratio of exports to GDP picking 
up as some liberalisation policies were put in place.
11 The ratio of exports to 
GDP increased to about 14 percent in 1992 and has remained at about 13–14 
percent since then.  
Figure 1 also shows that there might not be any clear relationship 
between the EFS and export performance. The introduction of the EFS in 1973 
does not appear to have had any immediate impact. Even though the EFS/GDP 
ratio started rising sharply in 1977 when all manufactured products were 
allowed to take concessionary credit under the scheme, export performance did 
not show such improvement. The ratio declined to 3.62 percent in 1985 and then 
remained at around 4.75 percent on average till 1998. Interestingly, from 1985 
to 1998, exports as a percentage of GDP rose from 8 to 14 percent. The decline 
in export financing as a percentage of exports after 1999 was mainly associated 
to the FE-25 scheme of foreign exchange loans [Janjua (2004)].
12 From this 
analysis, it is straightforward to conclude that the impact of the EFS on exports 
is insignificant. 
 






















































































































































































































































































































Exports Financing as percetnage of GDP Exports as percentage of GDP
 
                                                 
11A managed float was adopted in 1981 and a largely sensible exchange system that 
eliminated substantial periods of overvaluation was established by the mid-1980s.  
12The FE-25 scheme was introduced in 1998 to facilitate home remittances and mobilise 
foreign exchange resources. Foreign currency deposits were allowed freely (without asking) to any 
authorised commercial banks/NBFIs that were free to accept foreign currency deposits from any 
party in any one of the major four currencies, i.e., US dollars, Japanese yen, Deutsche marks, and 
British pounds sterling. Parties are then also allowed to invest/lend the same in Pakistan or 
keep/invest abroad subject to their observing regulations [Janjua (2004)].  




































































   4 
Rebate/refunds followed an increasing trend in the first few years when 
the negative list took effect in 1981.
13 It was 0.6 percent of GDP (6.3 percent of 
total exports) in 1982–83 and 0.64 percent of GDP (6 percent of total exports) in 
1987–88 when the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-funded structural 
adjustment programme was started. Due to tariff rationalisation in 1987–88, the 
rebate/refunds scheme was expected to decline. However, it continued to grow 
till 1992–93 when it reached 0.77 percent of GDP (5.82 percent of exports). It 
started falling in 1993–94 and sank as low as 0.42 percent of GDP (3.18 percent 
of exports) in 1994–95. There is, overall, a positive relationship between 
rebate/refunds as a percentage of GDP and exports as percentage of GDP. 
Moreover, the decrease in rebate/refunds as a percentage of GDP could be 
associated with the decline in tariff on imports (the correlation between average 
tariff and rebate/refunds as a percentage of exports has been 73 percent since 
tariff rationalisation started).
14 
Manufacturers use raw materials or machinery to produce foods for 
export. This implies that rebate/refunds on raw materials or machinery may have 
a lagged impact on exports. Table 1 shows a strong positive correlation between 
exports as a percentage of GDP and rebate/refunds as percentage of GDP. The 
correlation between the two variables increases and becomes significant when 
we analyse it using lags. On the other hand, the correlation between exports as a 
percentage of GDP and export financing as a percentage of GDP at all lags and 
levels is around 30 percent, which is quite low and insignificant.  
 
Table 1 
Correlation of Exports as a Percentage of GDP with Export Subsidies 
  Export Financing as  
Percentage of GDP 
Rebates/Refunds as  
Percentage of GDP 
Level  0.316 (0.34)  0.528 (0.63) 
1  0.315 (0.34)  0.659 (0.90) 
2  0.309 (0.33)  0.717 (1.05) 
3  0.319 (0.34)  0.790 (1.31) 
4  0.282 (0.30)  0.863 (1.74)
b 
5  0.292 (0.31)  0.896 (2.06)
a 
Notes:  
a, b Indicate significance levels of 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Values in parentheses 
indicate t-values. 
                                                 
13Trade liberalisation started in 1981 with a decline in the ban and quota list. 
14Overall, the total rebate/refunds amount has increased each year except over the last few 
years.   5 
3.  ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF EXPORT  
SUBSIDY SCHEMES 
In order to estimate the impact of the two schemes on exports, we need to 
examine the time series properties of the variables. Figures 1 and 2 show that all 
three variables that need to be examined are heavily trended. The subsidy 
element has been in constant decline as a matter of policy while exports have 
increased over the long period as is to be expected. In order to derive an 
unbiased estimate of the impact of the two policies on exports, we need to 
ensure that this trend in the two variables does not contaminate our estimates. 
This requires some econometric testing and data manipulation.  
 



















































































































































































































































































































Rebates/Refunds as percentage of GDP Exports as percentage of GDP
 
 
To check the unit root, we apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
using both constant and trend on the log of USA real GDP and the log of exports 
as a percentage of GDP (Table 2). The Philip-Perron (PP) test is applied using 
the constant term on the log of the real exchange rate because there are structural 
breaks in the series. Each series is checked at various lagged differences in ADF 
and at various truncated lags in the PP test (Table 2). Results on unit root test 
show that log of exports as a percentage of GDP and log of the real exchange 
rate are difference stationary i.e. I(1), while log of USA real GDP is stationary at 
level i.e. I(0). We then proceed to check the long-run and short-run impact of 
both policies on exports using a co-integration and error correction mechanism, 
respectively. 


































































   6 
Table 2 
ADF Test Results 
       Log of Exports as Percentage of GDP 











1   –1.400   –2.640   –4.372
a   –4.257
b 
2   –1.371   –2.319   –4.390
a   –4.367
a 
3   –1.676   –1.709   –4.195
a   –4.377
a 
4   –1.676   –1.115   –3.147
b   –3.370
b 
5   –1.427   –0.861   –2.625
c   –2.651 
6   –0.945   –0.838   –1.307   –1.397 











1   –0.568   –3.705
b   –3.738
a   –3.657
b 
2   –0.060   –3.915
b   –4.031
a   –3.937
b 
3   0.140    –3.386
c   –4.301
a   –4.256
b 
4    0.600   –3.143   –2.940
b   –2.962 
5   0.519    –4.185
b   –3.430
b   –3.400
c 
6    0.504   –3.213   –2.964




c Indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Values in parentheses 
indicate lags where the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is at a minimum. 
 
Table 3 
PP Test Results 
  Log of Real Exchange Rate 
Truncated Lag  Level (1)  First Difference (1) 
1   0.812    –3.464
b 
2   0.669    –3.564
b 
3   0.589    –3.640
b 
4   0.542    –3.707
a 
5   0.520    –3.740
a 
6   0.514    –3.752
a 
Notes:  
a, b Indicate significance levels of 1 and 5 respectively. Values in parentheses indicate lags 
where the residual variance with correction is at a minimum.   7 
Various methods of co-integration are available: the two most popular 
are (i) the Engle-Granger single equation two-step co-integration approach 
and (ii) the multiple equation Johansen co-integration approach. In this 
paper, we need to assess the impact of export subsidies on exports. 
Therefore, the multiple co-integration approach is not required. The most 
popular and widely used single equation co-integration approach, the Engle-
Granger approach, has certain shortcomings, which can generally be 
overcome by using a technique proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1997)
15 
known as the Auto-Regressive distributed lag (ARDL) co-integration 
approach [see Khan, Qayyum, and Sheikh (2005)]. The estimates from the 
ARDL approach yield consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients 
irrespective of the order of integration of variable, i.e., whether I(0) or I(1) 
(see Appendix B for details of the estimate procedure). 
Based on the methodology given in Appendix B, the estimate results 
(Appendix C) show that there is a long-run relationship among the 
variables.
16 Normalised co-integrating vectors in Table 4 show that, in the 
long run, export financing has a negative impact on exports, which is 
somewhat surprising. The DDR effect on exports seems to be positive but 
insignificant, that the data appears to support the hypothesis of anomalies 
and procedural delays and the capture of the scheme by rent-seekers. The 
statistical analysis clearly shows that subsidy schemes achieve their 
objective of increasing exports. Error Correction model is used to check the 
short-run impact of the subsidy schemes (see Table 5). The short-run impact 
of the EFS on exports is insignificant, while the coefficient of the DDR 
scheme is significant at 6 percent, which implies that it has some impact on 
exports in the short run. 
 
Table 4 
Normalised Long-run Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
LXY(–1) 1.00   
LR(–1) 0.30  0.95 
LYUSA(–1) –1.74  –1.31 
LXFX(–1) 0.16  2.93
a 
LDDX(–1) –0.10  –0.70 
Note:  
a indicates significance level of 10 percent.  
                                                 
15The first version of this study came out in 1995. 
16Wald test is used to see the long relationship among the variables.   8 
Table 5 
Vector Error Correction Model 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic Prob. 
C   –0.045   –1.22    0.24 
Error Termt-1   1.000   3.85
a   0.00 
D(LXY(–1))   0.103   0.76   0.46 
D(LXY(–2))   –0.153    –1.33   0.20 
D(LR(–1))   0.118   0.61   0.55 
D(LR(–2))   –0.277   –1.46    0.16 
D(LYUSA(–1))   –1.681   –2.24
b   0.04 
D(LYUSA(–2))   4.198   5.65
a   0.00 
D(LXFY(–1))   –0.048   –0.88    0.39 
D(LXFY(–2))   –0.025   –0.60    0.56 
D(LDDY(–1))   0.117   2.03
c   0.06 
D(LDDY(–2))   0.010   0.20   0.84 
R





c Indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, exports have been eligible for 
foreign currency loans under the FE-25 scheme since 1998–99. However, there 
is no data available on foreign currency loans since the FE-25 scheme was 
started. Thus, to capture the impact of foreign loans under the EFS, we use a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 up until 1998–99 and zero afterwards. 
Similar to previous results, co-integration exists among the variables when we 
use the slope dummy with the EFS and the lag order 2. Results obtained in Table 
6 show that, in the long run, export financing has a negative impact on exports 
while the rebate/refunds scheme has a positive but insignificant impact. Error 
correction results (Table 7) show that, in the short run, the rebate/refunds 
scheme has some positive impact on exports but the EFS is insignificant to 
export growth in the short run.  
 
Table 6 
Normalised Long-run Coefficients Using Dummy Variable 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
LXY(–1)   1.00   
LR(–1)   0.25   1.17 
LYUSA(–1)   –1.95   –2.09
c 
LXFX(–1)   0.04   0.75 
LXFX(–1)
a  DUMFE25   0.07   2.48
b 




c Indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.   9 
Table 7 
Vector Error Correction Model 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic Prob. 
C   –0.097   –1.76
c   0.10 
Error Term with Dummyt–1  1.000   2.55
b   0.02 
D(LXY(–1))   0.026   0.16   0.88 
D(LR(–1))   0.308   1.24   0.23 
D(LYUSA(–1))   –1.410   –1.61    0.13 
D(LXFY(–1))   –0.269   –1.80
c   0.09 
D(LXFY(–1))
aDUMFE25   0.259   1.60   0.13 
D(LDDY(–1))   0.173   2.31
b   0.04 
D(LXY(–2))   –0.100   –0.74    0.47 
D(LR(–2))   –0.169   –0.74    0.47 
D(LYUSA(–2))   4.433   4.97
a   0.00 
D(LXFY(–2))   –0.171   –1.14    0.27 
D(LXFY(–2))
aDUMFE25   0.177   1.05   0.31 
D(LDDY(–2))   –0.006   –0.09    0.93 
R





c Indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
We have assessed the impact of subsidy schemes on exports over the last 
three decades. Our econometric investigation shows that both subsidy 
mechanisms—export financing and rebate/refunds—have an insignificant 
impact on exports in the long run. In the short run, the rebate/refunds scheme 
seems to have a small positive impact.  
Economists are mostly opposed to these outmoded subsidy schemes 
because they are (i) not well targeted, (ii) not easy to administer, and (iii) open 
to rent-seeking. In the case of Pakistan, subsidy schemes have not achieved their 
objective to increase exports, suggesting that one or all the conjectures put 
forward by economists could be operative.  
It is interesting to note that these schemes have been in place for about 
three decades with little systematic evaluation, perhaps out of policy inertia. 
Meanwhile, the share of exports in GDP has been stagnant for a while. Given 
this, and the results of the study, suggests that there is urgent need to evaluate 
the various government initiatives for export promotion.  
   10
Appendixes 
APPENDIX A 
FACILITIES/INCENTIVES PROVIDED TO EXPORTERS 
This appendix describes what facilities/incentives are provided to exporters.
17 
In order to improve and enhance exports from Pakistan, exporters have 
been given calculated facilities/incentives. The objective of these 
facilities/incentives is to make exports zero-rated, which means that the exporter 
does not pay any tax on sales abroad. The major facilities/incentives available to 
exporters at present are: 
• Export financing at the rate of 13 percent under the SBP’s EFS. 
• Export financing under the foreign currency export finance facility 
(FCEF/$.Window) for the purchase of inputs domestically or import of 
foreign inputs for exportable goods. 
• Export credit guarantees under Pakistan Export Finance Guarantee 
Agency (PEFGA) to those able to fulfil collateral requirements for 
obtaining export finance. 
• Income tax at the rate of 0.75–1.25 percent for different commodities 
under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979. 
• Facilities under the Temporary Importation Scheme. 
• Facilities under the Common Bonded Warehouse Scheme. 
• Facilities under the Pioneering Export Marketing and Product 
Upgradation Fund (PEMPUF) (currently in its development phase). 
• Duty Drawback Scheme. 
• Export House Scheme. 
• Payment of commission to agents abroad. 
• Opening of offices abroad. 
• Protocol passes to leading exporters for access to lounges at national 




The SBP introduced the Refinance Scheme in 1973 to provide 
concessionary export finance to promote the export of non-traditional and 
emerging commodities. Subsequently, the scope of the scheme was enlarged to 
include all manufactured goods. Commodities such as raw cotton, rice, wool, 
and hides and skins remained ineligible for concessionary export finance (see 
Appendix Table 1). The scheme witnessed a further operational change in 
                                                 
17This section is based on the Export Promotion Bureau website. See http://www.epb. 
gov.pk/epb/jsp/faqans.jsp?faq_id=10. 
18This section is based on the Export Promotion Bureau website. See http://www.epb. 
gov.pk/epb/jsp/faqans.jsp?faq_id=19.   11
October 1977 when it was divided into two parts, I and II, the underlying 
systems of each being quite distinct from one other. 
Under Part I of the scheme, finance was admissible on a case-to-case 
basis. An exporter with a contract or letter of credit for the export of any eligible 
commodity could obtain pre-shipment loan finance from his or her bank for 150 
days; this period was extended to 180 days. On request to the SBP, the loan-
disbursing bank was eligible for refinance provided that it had already disbursed 
finance to the exporter. Further, exporters were eligible for post-shipment 
finance till realisation of exports proceeds or 180 days, whichever is earlier. 
Exporters were under obligation to produce the relevant shipping documents 
within the prescribed period, failing which a fine was levied as prescribed under 
the scheme for non-shipment. In case an exporter was unable to export goods for 
any reason, he or she could substitute a new contract or letter of credit for an old 
contract or letter of credit and export the same or different eligible goods to the 
same or other buyers, provided they had not availed finance against the new 
contract or letter of credit. 
Under Part II of the scheme, a limit equal to 5/12 of the proceeds realised 
during the previous year was allowed on a revolving basis against such realisations 
reported on the export finance EE statement duly verified by the Foreign Exchange 
Department. Exporters were under obligation to realise export proceeds equal to 2.4 
times during the relevant financial year on the EF statement prescribed for that 
purpose. In case of failure to realise matching export proceeds, exporters would then 
be required to pay a fine as prescribed for non-performance.  
The above provisions of the scheme have not provided sufficient 
incentive to the entities that are responsible for completion of a product actually 
meant for export by the exporter against a contract/letter of credit received from 
abroad. In order to provide incentives to all sectors of the economy, the EFS was 
revised, under the new modus operandi of which, banks are to ensure that the 
financing facilities offered by the scheme are made available to the other entity 
generating exports, i.e., indirect exporters, instead restricting finance to only one 
entity directly exporting eligible commodities. 
Under the revised procedures, efforts have also been made to ensure that 
small, medium, and emerging exporters as well as indirect exporters have adequate 
access to the EFS’s credit facilities, if otherwise eligible. As an important tool to 
ensure this, the government also intends to introduce a pre-shipment export finance 
guarantee (PEFG) scheme to be administered through a new corporate entity. The 
cover obtained by exporters under the said scheme, particularly by small and 
medium exporters, will substitute for the collateral requirements of banks and thus 
hedge the financing risk of commercial banks against manufacturing non-
performance, non-delivery risk, and non-payment by exporters. 
The maximum rate of finance that banks can charge their borrowers under 
this scheme remains 13 percent at present.    12
Appendix Table 1 
List of Commodities Ineligible for Concessionary Export Finance  
Under the Export Financing Scheme 
1  Raw cotton (excluding surgical bleached/absorbent) 
2  Cotton yarn (excluding cotton sewing thread, blended yarn containing 
49 percent cotton, dyed yarn, and yarn of Count 30 and above) 
3  Fish other than frozen and preserved 
4  Mutton and beef (excluding frogs’ legs) 
5 Petroleum  products 
6  Crude vegetable materials (excluding floricultural and horticultural 
products, rosebuds/flower, sassafras, and guar gum extract/guar protein) 
7  Wool and animal hair (excluding wool tops) 
8  Crude animal materials (excluding animal casings and fat-ends)  
9 Animal  feed 
10  All grains including grain flour (excluding Irri/basmati rice with brand 
names in packets of 1–50 kg) 
11  Stone, sand, and gravel  
12  Waste and scrap of all kinds 
13 Crude  fertiliser 
14  Oil seeds, nuts, and kernels 
15  Jewellery exported under the Entrustment Scheme 
16  Live animals (excluding hatching eggs and day-old chicks) 
17  Hides and skins 
18  Leather (wet blue)  
19 Inorganic  elements and oxides, etc. 
20  Crude minerals(excluding refined/treated salt) 
21  Works of art and antiques 
22  All metals (excluding Magnesite in processed form, blister copper, and 
chrome concentrates in processed form) 
23 Furs   
24  Wood in rough or squared cubes 
Source: http://www.epb.gov.pk/epb/jsp/faqans.jsp?faq_id=19? 
 
Export Finance under Part I 
Under Part I of the scheme, commercial banks shall provide finance to 
direct exporters (DEs), against a firm export order (FEO)/export letter of credit 
(ELC). They will also provide finance to those parties (indirect exporters or 
IDEs) who supply eligible inputs to DEs for further processing, provided that 
the DE has established an inland letter of credit/issued a standardised purchase 
order in favour of the IDE where applicable.    13
Export Finance under Part II 
Under Part II of the scheme, a DE is entitled to avail a finance limit 
equivalent to 50 percent of his or her export performance during the preceding 
year (July–June) in respect of eligible commodities by furnishing an undertaking 
to the bank as per form UT-DE-II. The DE may authorise his or her banker to 
open an import letter of credit (ILC)/issue an SRO(s) in favour of the IDE(s) for 
supplying inputs as per the procedure laid down within the prescribed limits in 
form DE-3. The amount of the limit availed by the DE as well as the amount of 
ILC(s) opened/SPO(s) issued in favour of the IDE(s) for the supply of domestic 
inputs, when taken together, should not exceed the DE’s entitled limit. The bank 
may, however, sanction a foreign currency loan in respect of the imported inputs 




The primary objective of the refund/rebates schemes is to facilitate 
taxpayers by paying back the amount of tax paid in excess of liability or as 
advance payment by them or, in the case of exports, taxes paid at the import 
stage or at stages of local manufacture. Although the duty drawback regime with 
the sole objective of export facilitation and promotion has been in operation 
since the 1970s, entertaining significant refund payments on account of sales tax 
has been a relatively recent phenomenon that is linked to the introduction of 
sales tax such as value-added tax since the mid-1990s. The expansion of the 
quantum of refunds is linked to the ever-expanding scope of sales tax by 
removing item-wise, sector-wise, and area-wise exemptions. Similarly, wide 
variations in refund claims against various subheads of direct taxes are an 
ongoing experience. 
Section 21(c) of the Customs Act 1969 allows repayment, in whole or part 
of the customs duties paid on the import of any goods that have been used in the 
production, manufacture, or processing of goods meant for export. Similarly, 
central excise duty paid on any imported material or components or excisable 
material used in the production, manufacture, or processing of exported goods is 
also refundable. The exporter files the rebate claim at the respective customs or 
export collectorate along with all supporting documents, including a calculation 
sheet, bank credit advice, airway bills, and bills of lading. The receiving officer, 
after determining that the claim is within time and legitimate and that the 
calculation sheet is correct, places it before the sanctioning authority. The 
sanctioning authority, i.e., the assistant collector/deputy collector/additional 
collector/collector (depending on the amount to be sanctioned) ensures that the 
claim is genuine in all respects and that there are no recoveries outstanding against 
the claimant. The refund claim is then sanctioned. 
                                                 
19This section is based on Ahmed and Ahmed (2002). For more details, see the main article.   14
Under Section 10 of the Sales Tax Act 1990, a taxpayer can adjust the tax 
paid on inputs and claim a refund if his or her input tax exceeds output tax. 
Similarly, since exports are zero-rated under Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act 
1990, it entitles exporters to claim refunds. 
The rebate wing of the CBR used to prescribe standard (non-
company-specific) and individual (company-specific) DDRs. It allowed the 
refund of import duty, central excise duty, and sales tax paid on the import 
of goods used in the production, manufacture, or processing of goods 
exported from Pakistan. However, with time it was realised that the scheme 
had failed to produce the desired results. There was no systematic estimate 
or update of input-output coefficients (IOCs) and the process of fixing and 
administering rates lacked transparency. DDRs were often higher than the 
incidence of taxes actually incurred. Exporters were understandably content 
with this and confined their complaints mainly to delays in the payment 
process, etc. Data for the last 18 years manifest that DDRs have been much 
higher than they should have been.  
The Input-Output Coefficient Organisation (IOCO) was established in 
2001 with the objective of devising a systematic method to determine IOCs and 
DDRs in consultation with trade bodies, and to review and revise these rates 
periodically. It was believed that with the systematic calculation of IOCs and the 
resulting DDRs reflecting the incidence of duty actually paid would strengthen 
free trade policy by increasing the take-up of DTRE procedures, since setting 
accurate DDRs would remove the current attraction to drawbacks. Now, the 
IOCO determines the quantity of imported material required for use in a given 
quantity of manufactured end-product, and notifies standard or specific DDRs. 




DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Annual data on exports (both in US dollars and Pakistan rupees) are taken 
from various issues of the Pakistan Economic Survey. Data on exchange rates, 
the domestic consumer price index (CPI), USA CPI, USA nominal and real 
GDP, and USA GDP deflators are taken from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) and World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on USA real GDP are 
available till 2003 in WDI 2005, therefore, the last two values have been 
computed by using the USA’s nominal GDP (as given in IFS) divided by its 
GDP deflator. Data on export financing is taken from the SBP and on duty 
drawback from various issues of the CBR Annual Year Book and quarterly 
reports of the CBR. This study covers the period 1974 (when export financing 
started) to 2005.   15
Construction of Variables 
A simple export demand model is estimated below. The log
20 of exports 
as a percentage of GDP is taken as the dependant variable while the log of the 
real exchange rate and log of the USA real GDP are taken as explanatory 
variables. The USA real GDP is used as a proxy to world GDP because 
Pakistan’s largest share of trade is with the USA. Both duty drawback and 
export refinance variables are taken in log form as a percentage of total exports. 








USA real GDP (Y): 
deflators   GDP
terms nominal in GDP
 








It is necessary to make sure that the Johansen methodology used is 
superior if there are more than one co-integrating vectors and we are interested 
in checking multiple co-integrating vectors. However, the ARDL approach is 
better than other approaches if we need to check a single equation co-integrating 
relationship among variables [see Khan, Qayyum, and Sheikh (2005)] for more 
details). Similar to other approaches to co-integration, we initially need to check 
the order of integration for each variable. A detailed methodology is given 
below. 
A stochastic process is said to be stationary if it satisfies three conditions. 
First, the series exhibits mean reversion; it fluctuates around a constant long-run 
mean. Second, the variance of the series should be constant over time. Third, the 
value of auto-covariance between two time periods depends on the distance or 
lag between these periods and not on the actual time at which the covariance 
was computed. Other conditions that need to be satisfied for the series to be 
stationary are that the initial condition is not given, that no major random shock 
takes place, and that the sample size is quite large.
21  
                                                 
20Log implies natural log. 
21A series is said to be stationary if the it exhibits mean reversion and fluctuates around the 
long-run equilibrium value. It has constant, finite, and time-invariant variance, and has a 
correlogram that diminishes as lag length increases [Enders (1995)].   16
Co-integration 
A long-run equation is estimated using the following Equation (1) and the 
significance of the variables in lag-level forms checked jointly using an F-
statistic, i.e., Ho is β1 = β2 = 0. If the F-statistic is significant, we can say that 
there could be a long-run relationship between the variables. 
 















3 1 2 1 1 0  …  …  (1) 
The number of lagged differences is determined using AIC or SBC. This 
can be done by using a general to specific methodology, i.e., by checking the 
significance of all the differenced variables jointly at each lag. For example, if 
we regress the equation including four lags (lagged differences) of each variable 
and check all the terms of lag 4 jointly using the F-statistic, if it is insignificant 
we would again regress the equation using three lags and continue this process 
until it showed statistically significant results. Wald test is used to confirm the 
existence of co-integration. 
The next step involves generating an error/residual (εt) from Equation 1. 
The final step is to estimate an error correction model (ECM) to check the short-
run dynamics.  
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Variable Labelling 
Appendix Table 2 
Variable Labelling 
LXY  Log of exports as percentage of GDP 
LR  Log of real exchange rates 
LYUSA  Log of USA GDP 
LXFX  Log of export financing as percentage of GDP 
LDDX  Log of rebate/refunds as percentage of GDP 
DUMFE25  Define 1 till 1998–99 and zero afterwards 
Error Term  Error term from equation estimated without dummy




Appendix Table 3 
Results of ARDL Approach 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic Prob.   
C   –24.49    –1.37    0.19 
D(LXY(–1))   0.22   1.27   0.22 
D(LR(–1))   0.85
c   1.81   0.09 
D(LYUSA(–1))   –4.40
a   –3.51    0.00 
D(LXFX(–1))   0.15
c   1.88   0.08 
D(LDDX(–1))  –0.06   –0.46    0.65 
D(LXY(–2))   0.17   0.74   0.47 
D(LR(–2))   0.12   0.31   0.76 
D(LYUSA(–2))   0.74   0.56   0.59 
D(LXFX(–2))   0.14
b   2.20   0.05 
D(LDDX(–2))  –0.04   –0.43    0.68 
LXY(–1)   –0.91
a   –2.87    0.01 
LR(–1)   –0.26   –0.95    0.36 
LYUSA(–1)   1.48   1.31   0.21 
LXFX(–1)   –0.14
a   –2.93    0.01 
LDDX(–1)   0.09   0.70   0.50 
R




c Indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Evidence of Co-integration Using Wald Test 
F-statistic 2.98  Probability  0.0522 
Chi-square 14.90  Probability 0.0107 
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